NH #551: Nuclear Regulator Confesses! Former NRC Chair Jaczko's Tell-All Book!​​​​‌‍​‍​‍‌‍‌​‍‌‍‍‌‌‍‌‌‍‍‌‌‍‍​‍​‍​‍‍​‍​‍‌​‌‍​‌‌‍‍‌‍‍‌‌‌​‌‍‌​‍‍‌‍‍‌‌‍​‍​‍​‍​​‍​‍‌‍‍​‌​‍‌‍‌‌‌‍‌‍​‍​‍​‍‍​‍​‍‌‍‍​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​‍‍​‍​‍‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍‌​‌‍‍‌‌‍​‍‍‌‍‍‌‌‌‌‍​‌‍​‌‍‌‌‌‍​‌‌​‍‌‍‍​‌‍‌‌​‌​‌‍‌‌‌‍​‌‌‌​​‍‍‌‍​‌‍‌‍‌​‍‌‍‍‌‌‍‍‌‌​‌‍‌‌‌‍‍‌‌​​‍‌‍‌‌‌‍‌​‌‍‍‌‌‌​​‍‌‍‌‌‍‌‍‌​‌‍‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‍‌‍‌‌‌​‌‍‌‌‌‍‍‌‌​‌‍​‌‌‌​‌‍‍‌‌‍‌‍‍​‍‌‍‍‌‌‍‌​​‌‌‍‌‌‌​​‌‍‍‌‌​‌‍‌‍‌​‌‍‌‌​‍‌​‍‌​​​​​​​​​‍‌‌​‌‍‌‌​​‌‍‌‌​‌‌‍‌‌‌​​‌‍‍‌‌​‌‍‌‍‌​‌‍‌‌​‍‌​​‌‍​‌‌‌​‌‍‍​​‌‌‌​‌‍‍‌‌‌​‌‍​‌‍‌‌​‌‍​‍‌‍​‌‌​‌‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‍‌‍​​‌‌‍‍​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​‍‌‌​​‌​​‌​‍‌‌​​‍‌​‌‍​‍‌‌​​‍‌​‌‍‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍‌​‌‍‍‌‌‍​‍‍‌‍‍‌‌‌‌‍​‌‍​‌‍‌‌‌‍​‌‌​‍‌‍‍​‌‍‌‌​‌​‌‍‌‌‌‍​‌‌‌​​‍‍‌‍​‌‍‌‍‌​‍‌‍‌‍‍‌‌‍‌​​‌‌‍‌‌‌​​‌‍‍‌‌​‌‍‌‍‌​‌‍‌‌​‍‌​‍‌​​​​​​​​​‍‌‍‌‌​‌‍‌‌​​‌‍‌‌​‌‌‍‌‌‌​​‌‍‍‌‌​‌‍‌‍‌​‌‍‌‌​‍‌‍‌​​‌‍​‌‌‌​‌‍‍​​‌‌‌​‌‍‍‌‌‌​‌‍​‌‍‌‌​‍‌‍‌​​‌‍‌‌‌​‍‌​‌​​‌‍‌‌‌‍​‌‌​‌‍‍‌‌‌‍‌‍‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‍​‍‌‍​‌‍‍‌‌​‌‍‍​‌‍‌‌‌‍‌​​‍​‍‌‌

Libbe HaLevy

00:00:01

It’s one thing. If you hear me or friends or other activists say that nuclear reactors are bad, unsafe, and not a cure for global warming, but when you hear the former chair of the nuclear regulatory commission, say

Gregory Jaczko

00:00:17

There is a fundamental law in the technology and the design of these reactors, they really are built in such a way that you will always be on this precipice of on the one side safe operation on the other side accidents, sometimes catastrophic accidents. And that’s just the way that they are. One of the things that worries me right now is that so many people are looking at climate change and looking at nuclear as the solution, the silver bullet, if you will, for climate change. And I just think back to the Fukushima accident and realize that this is not a reliable technology. If we pin our hopes for climate change on nuclear power, we’re going to lose it in two ways. We’re going to probably have four accidents and we’re probably not going to solve the climate, but there are better ways to do this. There are cleaner technologies now that are cheaper, that are becoming more and more viable. And I think when you compare those to the challenges of nuclear power, it’s obvious what the right solution.

Libbe HaLevy

00:01:13

Well, isn’t that refreshing because when you hear something like that from some one like that, you begin to understand that even some nuclear professionals agree with what activists have been saying for years. And that means that truly we are all sitting in the exact same seat,

Announcer

00:01:35

Clear hot seat. What are those people thinking? Clear, hot seat. What have those boys been braking? our time to act is shrinking, but, it’s a bomb.

Libbe HaLevy

00:02:07

Welcome to nuclear hot seat, the weekly international news magazine, keeping you up to date on all things, nuclear from a different perspective. My name is Leebee Halevi. I’m the producer and host as well as a survivor of the nuclear accident at three mile island from just one mile away. So I know what can happen when those nuclear so-called experts get it wrong. This week, a very special extended interview with former chair of the nuclear regulatory commission, Gregory yacht SCO. He was the head of the NRC during the Fukushima crisis and was forced out after standing up for increased safety at us. Nuclear reactors Jasko has published a book confessions of a rogue nuclear regulator, and he has a lot to say about the nuclear industry from a unique perspective when we don’t normally have access to smack center on the inside and a nuclear hot seat is intensely pleased to be able to present an extended interview with him.

Libbe HaLevy

00:03:15

It is quite the ride. We will also have nuclear news from around the world numnuts of the week for outstanding nuclear bone headedness, and more honest nuclear information than the European union used to decide that, Hey, nukes are really green. Let’s invest all of it coming up in just a few moments. Today’s Tuesday, January 11th, 2022. And here is this week’s nuclear news from a different perspective here in the U S last month, the U S nuclear regulatory commission quietly reported preparing for tens of thousands of cross-country shipments of high level radioactive waste from nuclear reactors to the desert. Southwest transport from major highway and railroad lines would include the hottest most concentrated atomic waste from the nuclear fuel chain mistakenly labeled spent nuclear fuel because it contains plenty of radioactivity still available to be spent. And the two proposed destinations, one in west Texas, and one in New Mexico do not exist except as legal fictions at our boat.

Libbe HaLevy

00:04:26

The subject of lawsuits in Michigan on Thursday, January 6th, the cook nuclear plant near St. Joseph either had a fire or had a malfunctioning fire alarm. Confusing matters is that the fire protective system for the volt where the fire was detected is currently out of service. And last year, the nuclear facility deactivated all its warning sirens in favor of mobile alerts. So when it’s a fire at a nuke, not a fire at a nuke, the way things stand right now, there’s no way to tell. And we will link to a terrific article on the ferocious ins Liberte principle, man of the Western bands of the Shoshone nation and a fearless tireless opponent of the nuclear devastation done to his people and his land saying after 900 nuclear tests on our land, the U S wants to ethnically cleanse us calling the Shishoni people. The most bombed nation in the world in Japan, it’s been reported that Fukushima derived radio Caesium has arrived in the Arctic ocean Caesium 1 34 and 1 37 were measured in the Arctic ocean in 2019.

Libbe HaLevy

00:05:39

You a chiro, Kumamoto a senior researcher from Japan agency for Marine earth science technology speculated that had spread to the center of the Arctic ocean after spreading east from Fukushima, then northward after reaching the west coast of the United States and up to the Bering sea along the Alaska peninsula. Now with Tokyo electric power company, planning to discharge, radioactive water tritium water into the Pacific ocean, it’s likely to repeat the same path and further concerns have been raised in the UK. The Haitian two nuclear power station in Lancaster is to stop generating electricity. Two years earlier than planned. This would be in 2028. Haitian one will stop generating power in 2020 for Germany’s longest running anti-nuclear protests has ended after 35 years because on December 31st, the broke door nuclear reactor in Northern Germany was shut down. And Russia has released previously classified footage of the world’s largest nuclear explosion, Tsar Bomba from October of 1961, it carried the force of 50 million tons of conventional explosives, and we’ll post it on the website just so that you can have a, close-up look at hell on earth. And now

Libbe HaLevy

00:07:09

If you’re in Ontario and want to know if your local nuclear reactor is safe, it’s going to cost you $10,000. That was Ontario power generation’s response to a freedom of information request from the Ontario clean air Alliance. The publicly owned utility refuse to provide a copy of the analysis of pressure tube safety, which has raised a number of red flags over the last 10 months. Unless of course they get their bribe payment. Ontario clean air Alliance wants to have an independent nuclear expert. Look at what the Canadian nuclear safety commission think. Canadian version of the nuclear regulatory commission here in the U S what they’ve signed off on. And the C N S C itself has said that the public deserves to know more about what is happening with one of the world’s oldest fleets of nuclear reactors. We’ll have a link up on the website to where you can send a message to the president of the Canadian nuclear safety commission, because clearly they are this week’s

Libbe HaLevy

00:08:21

Here’s this week’s featured interview. When I first began nuclear hot seat in 2011, one of the people I reported on week after week was the chair of the nuclear regulatory commission, a man with a nigh on two unpronounceable, last name spelled J a C Z K O. We will not go into how many ways I butchered it back then. I wrote him off as just another pro nuke, bad guy, and targeted him for a lot of sarcastic comments. Only once he was forced out of the NRC. Did I start understanding that my perception had been, let’s just say, lacking nuance. And I began developing a different opinion of the man and his actions post Fukushima. I came to realize that within a difficult NY on to impossible situation, he had been doing the best he could to stand up for safety for as the NRC slogan, likes to state people and the environment in the ensuing years, I’ve interviewed Greg several times and learn how to properly pronounce his name.

Libbe HaLevy

00:09:37

Now he’s written a book confessions of a rogue nuclear regulator, and it is a bombshell and inside look at the power and politics of our nuclear regulatory body told by an ultimate insider who experienced firsthand, how the agency has been compromised by the very industry it’s supposed to oversee more than a cautionary tale. It is an out and out smack down done politely, but a SmackDown nonetheless, of an industry and a technology that has the power to destroy us all and has come close to doing so more than once logical methodical, well-written frequently funny and told with restraint yet complexity. Greg yachts goes, book must be read by everyone with an interest in understanding the failings of the nuclear industry. He explains its problems with clarity and brevity, as it only could be by someone who is expected to carry the technology’s banner and uncritically bend to its demands. Only he didn’t. I spoke with Greg yacht SCO on Thursday, January 10th, 2019. Apologies for the sound quality we had some challenges, Greg yacht go. It’s so good to have you back as an interviewee here on nuclear hot seat.

Gregory Jaczko

01:11:03

Well, thank you. It’s a pleasure to be here.

Libbe HaLevy

01:11:06

Let’s start out with a bit about your background. How did you come to the nuclear issue?

Gregory Jaczko

01:11:11

I came to it indirectly. Really. I started out with a career in science, getting a PhD in physics, and then got a fellowship that took me to Washington DC, where I worked for a Congressman from Massachusetts who was very involved in nuclear issues. And that’s largely how I got involved with them first dealing with nuclear proliferation issues, and then ultimately with the nuclear power issues. After doing that fellowship, I then wound up working for Senator Harry Reid from Nevada who wanted a scientist to help him to deal with the policy around the Yucca mountain, the waste repository. And from there, he helped get me on to the nuclear regulatory commission. And then I was fortunate to be appointed chairman by president Obama when he became

Libbe HaLevy

01:11:57

Now, you never intended to be a commissioner at the NRC, let alone its chair. And you fashioned yourself as what you call a nuclear power, moderate. Explain what that means to you.

Gregory Jaczko

01:12:09

I came to Washington and came to these issues. I was a scientist by training and nuclear power was a scientific and technical issue to me, more than anything else. So when I joined the commission, I had spent some time working on the policy and dealing with the issues, but didn’t really have a firm view about the technology, about the industry, about all the aspects of nuclear power.

Libbe HaLevy

01:12:33

And clearly as we will get into, there was also a lack of understanding about the politics that you would face as well.

Gregory Jaczko

01:12:41

I certainly, when I got to the commission got a much clearer sense of the politics and really the influence of the industry, not just at the agency itself, but with Congress as well.

Libbe HaLevy

01:12:52

Would it be fair to say that you were perceived by the industry and its supporters as a nuclear Maverick, even before you became a commissioner?

Gregory Jaczko

01:13:01

I certainly think the industry was concerned about my joining the commission, and there was a lot of opposition to that, that Senator Reed using his, his influence was able to overcome. They were took almost two years from the time I was initially nominated to join the commission to the time that I actually joined. And I think that was the first indication to me that, that there was a lot of opposition. And mostly that was based on the work that I had done for then Congressman Markey. And for Senator Reed, both of whom were Senator Reed was very opposed to the echo mountain nuclear waste repository. Congressman Markey was very focused on new crusades. So by reputation, I acquired their views and that’s largely, the industry really was concerned about my joining the commission to begin with.

Libbe HaLevy

01:13:46

When you first joined the commission and were just a commissioner, what were some of the frustrations that you faced within the agency?

Gregory Jaczko

01:13:54

When I first joined the commission and as one of the five members on the commission, it was a time in which I had my views and I largely advocated for them within the commission process and did what I could to move issues in the direction I thought was more focused on safety. One of the things I was most proud of was spearheading a change in the regulation that required all nuclear, new nuclear power plants to be protected against a nine 11 style aircraft attack. And that was something I was able to do with working with my colleagues on the commission. I think really the power of the industry. I didn’t really feel until I became chairman because then I was the focal point for the agency. I was the chairman, I was the chief executive. I was the chief spokesperson and without authority came tremendous responsibility. And it also made me someone that the industry was very focused on. And in terms of what I was going to do, what I was going to say in,

Libbe HaLevy

01:14:48

To what extent did you come to believe that the nuclear industry has a tremendous amount, if not too much influence over the NRC and its decision-making process?

Gregory Jaczko

01:14:59

Well, I really started to see that as chairman, when I would have issues or discuss issues with the agency staff and begin to understand that the industry was talking to them and really in a very pervasive level. And to a certain extent they’re able to do that. But what was unfortunate is that in a way there weren’t any countervailing voices that it really wasn’t a way of one-sided communication, where you really only had the industry providing that level of interaction and feedback to the staff. And so part of what I saw my role and responsibility as was providing the staff was covering another voice that was willing to push back. And in the book I recount some of those stories, one issue, really being an issue involved with updating the fire protection standards that we had a nuclear power plants. And just seeing how, as I was working with the staff to try and move that issue forward, the industry was pushing back and they were very pervasive in their efforts to do that and working, trying to work through the staff, trying to work through sympathetic commissioners. And that really opened my eyes to the way that they were really involved in trying to make sure that the agency wasn’t doing things that they felt were ultimately not good for their bottom line.

Libbe HaLevy

01:16:15

One important point that you make is that determining nuclear safety is as much a political decision as it is a scientific one. And of course we have to add in the financial aspect of that as well. What are the prevailing winds? What is it that takes precedent? One that decisions are actually made

Gregory Jaczko

01:16:35

All policy really is a almost political process where different voices come together to try and agree on what the right answer is going forward. And especially at an organization like the nuclear regulatory commission. So much of what goes into those decisions is scientific and technical information. But ultimately in that, as I talked about in the book, when we really get to the ideas of safety, those are cultural societal decisions. What kind of risk we’re willing to tolerate? What kind of protection is sufficient? Those are all very difficult, challenging issues that ultimately have many, many views about the right answers. And at the NRC, one of the louder voices in the room was often the industry. And then of course for them, not only did they have a responsibility to generate power through nuclear power plants, but they also had a responsibility to make money. They were businesses. And with that came a different point of emphasis. And, you know, I felt it was the job of the agency to not consider that by law. In fact, we weren’t allowed to consider cost. And so that was an often a point of contention as we work to try and figure out the right answers.

Libbe HaLevy

01:17:41

You were the chair of the nuclear regulatory commission on March 11th, 2011, which is one, the 9.0 earthquake. And tsunami happened off the coast of Japan, hit the coast of Japan and hit the nuclear reactors at Fukushima. That’s when the nuclear disaster there first began. How did you first learn of this and what was your immediate responsibility?

Gregory Jaczko

01:18:05

So I first learned about the earthquake and the tsunami from a phone call from the operation center at the agency on that was early that Friday morning. And they told me that there had been an earthquake. There had been a tsunami, and we were looking to see if there was going to be an impact on plants on the west coast of the United States. And it’s one of those amazing facts that you could have an earthquake and the ocean close to Japan and tsunami wave to travel all the way across the Pacific ocean and hit the west coast of the us. So that was really the initial focus for me as, as that incident was developing. And then as the day went on that transition, once we knew in particular that the plants in California were fine, it started to transition to a recognition that something more severe was happening in Japan with their reactors.

Libbe HaLevy

01:18:53

When the accident began, you stated that while you saw your role in it as to provide support guidance and direction to Japan and your position as the NRC, how open was Japan to that? And what kind of pressure were you under from the nuclear industry? From the start to make the statement that everything was okay,

Gregory Jaczko

01:19:15

The accident developed Japan became more and more receptive to working with us and open to us offering assistance and guidance. Certainly as the accident began, my focus was on really deferring to them. And because they were closest, they knew more about what’s going on than we did. And certainly at the accident develop, everyone realized that none of us knew as much as we really needed to know. So when I initially was confronted with the accident, I fell back to my training, which was really that in the event of an accident or some situation like this, you want to revert to the people who are closest to what’s going on because they probably have the best information. And as the accident went on, then in some areas, we started to diverge a little bit in terms of what we thought was happening, what we thought could happen, what the Japanese were doing, and recount a few of those episodes in the book of times, in which we made decisions and made recommendations that were different. And, you know, that was something that I did. And I did because we were looking at the information and making what we thought were the best decisions possible. Certainly after some of the public decisions were made in particular, the recommendation for 50 mile evacuation, the industry became a little more vocal in how they were reacting to what was going on. And I think really began their efforts in the public media to try and paint as positive a picture of what was going on with the United States reactors as they could

Libbe HaLevy

02:20:46

Until Fukushima the perceived wisdom in the nuclear industry was that a 10 mile evacuation radius from a nuclear accident would be sufficient. What led you to change that? And declare a 50 mile evacuation zone from Fukushima, for Americans in Japan,

Gregory Jaczko

02:21:04

Really as an agency, what we were trained to do, which was we ran analysis of the deteriorating condition of the reactors, and we plug those into our models and our, our estimates of what we should do for an evacuation. And that’s where we came up with the 50 miles. Part of the challenge at that time was that our inputs about what was going on were limited because we didn’t have a lot of information about the plan. So we were making some, some judgments about what was going on, and that’s how we came to our conclusions. You know, it was really the agency at its best doing what it was prepared to do, which was to take information, analyze that information and make objective recommendations about what to do. And the ultimate conclusion we made was that if this plant were in the United States and we were getting the same information we were getting, we would be recommending a 50 mile evacuation. We communicated that to the white house and ultimately the white house agreed. And the president agreed and the agency or the government went forward with that advice to Americans

Libbe HaLevy

02:22:02

In your heart of hearts, in your secret, inner thinking, did you ever reach a point with hookah Shamo where you thought we’ve really done it? A line has been crossed and there’s no coming back from this one,

Gregory Jaczko

02:22:16

You know, while we were in it, it was hard to realize that, but there certainly were points looking back where it was clear that the accident had reached a tipping point where it was really going to progress to something very, very severe and very significant. I didn’t never imagined while I was in the middle of it, that it was something that was going to consume such a large portion of my time, of the agency’s time, or really the us government’s time as we look to try and help the Japanese deal with this as best they could. There was one moment though, where I remember being in our operation center and talking to a staff, or kind of one of the, the grizzled staffers that you want working at the NRC. And he kind of slumped in his chair and said, you know, this is not supposed to happen.

Gregory Jaczko

02:23:03

And, you know, I started to get more and more of those bits of information and what was happening. It was just not supposed to happen. This was not supposed to be there. It wasn’t supposed to be an accident anymore. And, you know, to a large extent, so much was happening so quickly that it was hard to kind of take a step back and really assess that bigger picture. It wasn’t until the accident really ended. When we began looking at the ways that we needed to shore up us plans, that it really hit something really fundamental had happened here, that the Mirage really perfect safety had been listed. And it was clear that nuclear power plants could have accidents. Not only could they have axes, but they did really have accidents. And that was kind of a watershed moment for me, as I really started focusing on dealing with the us plants and how to make them better.

Libbe HaLevy

02:23:52

How involved and for how long did you remain involved in the assessments and mitigation plans and Fukushima?

Gregory Jaczko

02:24:02

So the U S was, was engaged in this for quite some time. I was personally involved in, in the beginning and really the whole agency was mobilized to, to respond in the beginning part to the act and that we were operating 24 hours a day with our operation center, providing information to the Japanese, providing information to the us government, and then really went all the way until December of that year. When I went back to Japan and had an opportunity then to see the conclusion really of the accident. So it was something that we call cold shutdown or something that a normal operation of a nuclear power plant when it shuts down, happens in a matter of hours or because of the accident. The reactor only got into that condition after four or five months. And that was really in a way, the termination of my role and my direct involvement in that incident. But it was to go to Japan, to go back to Japan, for me to really work with the Japanese, to make that determination that in fact, they were in cold shutout in the accident had really resolved itself in first phase, really the accident there was still a lot to do and a lot that’s still going on today when it comes to the accident,

Libbe HaLevy

02:25:13

2011 seems to be a watershed year for nuclear accidents and near misses that same year, you have to deal with the flooding of the Missouri river at Fort Calhoun, nuclear reactor near Omaha, Nebraska. That’s what turned the site into a virtual island in the middle of the river protected only by an eight foot inflatable berm, which at one point was damaged. And the water from the river came to within inches of the facility. And then there was also the aftermath of the 5.8 earthquake near the north Anna reactors in Virginia, that happened in August, which consisted of a shaking that exceeded the design basis of the facility. What was, it was intended to be able to withstand what impact did these accidents have on your perception of the nuclear industry and the safety of nuclear power plants,

Gregory Jaczko

02:26:03

Both of those incidents, which at which I, I do recall or account in the book just brought home. The fact that this accident was not a problem in a far away country, that these kinds of incidents were real. They could happen even in the United States and they would happen different than we imagined the flooding in Missouri river. It was an amazing spectacle of nature to see I went and visited the plant and was just as I approached the plant. I remember walking there, walking on a walkway that had been set up because the plant was completely surrounded by floodwaters and seeing the slow in the volume of water rushing by that plant, you realize this was a tremendous force of nature, but it was completely different than what had happened in Fukushima. It was a very different way that nature was challenging. Our technology was challenging, all the systems that we had built and designed.

Gregory Jaczko

02:26:57

And luckily at that plant, the water levels didn’t rise enough to trigger a severe accident, but they came close. And so it really instilled in me that the fact that we had to do something about making plants safer, that we couldn’t just look to the Japan accident and say that this is something happening in a far away country. And then of course, we see another incident shortly after that with an earthquake. And again, an earthquake that exceeded well by west coast standards was not a larger spike. It was an earthquake that was bigger than what the plant in Virginia had been designed around. So again, it was a recognition that all our standards and all our regulations weren’t as good as they needed to be. We needed to make changes. And that was part of what I was focusing my efforts on at that point was trying to get the reforms that the staff of the agency had established and get those passed by the commission and ultimately put in place

Libbe HaLevy

02:27:49

That leads us to the blue ribbon task force on safety that you convene through the NRC after Fukushima, what did it consist of and what did it do?

Gregory Jaczko

02:28:01

The panel that we established the task force that we established was really one of the most proud moments of my time at the NRC, working with my colleagues on the commission, we established this organization to take a look, both a short-term kind of immediate look at changes that needed to be made to plants in the U S and then a longer term look, which was to be dealt with later. We assembled a group of some of the best and brightest people at the NRC and gave them three months to go out and try and identify the most important lessons and the most important sixes to those lessons. And three months later, they came back to us and gave us their best judgment about what needed to be fixed. And I still look back and really am amazed at the quality of the work that they were able to do in such a short time with so much external pressure and so much interest in what they were doing. Because as I told them, what they did was really going to set the tone for the rest of the world about what you needed to do to deal with this Fukushima accident for any country that had nuclear power plants. And I’m so proud to this day of the work that they were able to do and the recommendations that they were able to come up with.

Libbe HaLevy

02:29:10

How was that report and how were those recommendations received both at the NRC and by the nuclear industry?

Gregory Jaczko

02:29:18

Yeah. This is where I think I began to see some of the, the pressure that the industry was going to put the biggest response that I got from my colleagues. So of course, for the, some of the most important recipients of the report, because they were the people I was going to have to work with to implement the recommendation. The reaction I got from most of them was really that the staff had just done too much. That initially there was an effort to try and prevent the report from being made public without essentially vetting it through the commission so that they could water it down a little bit. And this is where I really started to recognize that I was not going to have a lot of allies in this fight to try and implement these recommendations. And I really dedicated the rest of my time at the agency to doing that, to doing the best I could to get these recommendations implemented.

Gregory Jaczko

03:30:08

And you know, it, wasn’t a moment of disappointment for me because the people who did the report and the agency were really unimpeachable. These were viewed as the best and brightest of kind of our up and coming managers and technical staff. And so their conclusions were not extreme conclusions. They were reasonable conclusions, but they were meaningful and they meant things needed to change. And when I was talking around the time of the Fukushima accident, I reassured the American people that we believe that the plants were safe, but I also told them that we would take a look and we would identify issues that needed to be fixed. And if we did, we would fix them. And I felt I had made that promise to the American people, and I had an obligation to do what I could to implement that report and all those recommendations. Sadly, many of them have never been implemented. It never will, but, you know, at the time I did the best I could to get as many as possible.

Libbe HaLevy

03:31:08

Why do you think that the industry was so resistant to implementing the safety fixes? Is it simply a matter of the money?

Gregory Jaczko

03:31:17

Yeah, it really, it really just comes down to the profit and the ability to operate nuclear reactors. You know, if you’re requiring a lot of changes and a lot of modifications that ultimately cost the owners and operators of the plants and could potentially put them in a situation which they cannot make a profit it’s, you know, that’s not to say that that’s a bad thing, that that’s the responsibility of the power companies. It’s not only to generate the electricity and do it safely, but it’s also to make money they’re for-profit corporations. They have that obligation as well. And my view was it’s the responsibility of the NRC to make sure that the safety changes that were needed regardless of the costs were made. And that’s where I began to see some divergence in opinion, between myself, the industry and the commissioners,

Libbe HaLevy

03:32:07

In terms of the range of recommendations that were made in this report, what percentage of them have moved forward and being implemented?

Gregory Jaczko

03:32:17

Well, it’s a little bit hard to put it into the percentage. I think if you look at what the basic thrust of that report was, it said that the commission should look at accidents beyond the kinds of apps that they considered up until that point and be a little bit more open to new types of challenges, new types of incidents that could cause the serious and to do everything possible, to prevent them from happening to begin with, or prevent accidents from happening in those situations. And to really stop them in their tracks if they get going. And a lot of what’s happened with those recommendations is that the work has focused and shifted more and more towards really just responding to them when they happen, rather than trying to do a lot, to actually prevent them. And I think that’s the missed opportunity, but there are a number of things that the report recommended that would make the accidents less likely, not just less destructive when they happen.

Gregory Jaczko

03:33:16

And that’s really become more of the focus is just on doing things that will respond better than what’s already built in. I think we can do better because at the end of the day, even if a nuclear reactor doesn’t contaminate and pollute a large area around the plan that the accident of the reactors law, that’s a huge asset, it’s expensive. And, you know, it’s one of the things that worries me right now is that so many people are looking at climate change and looking at nuclear as the solution, the silver bullet, if you will, for climate change. And I just think back to the Fukushima act and then realize that this is not a reliable technology. If you look at what happened to Japan after the accident, there really a large portion of their efforts to battle and reduce carbon dioxide emissions came down to their nuclear fleet.

Gregory Jaczko

03:34:01

Well, after the accident, they lost six reactors for sure. But then their, almost their entire fleet is now in operative because of the act. So, you know, you, you have a technology that is right now looked at so much as a piece of the climate change puzzle of not the piece, the key piece of the climate change puzzle. And I look at it and I see a technology that’s not reliable. That’s subject to these catastrophic accidents that can cause shutdown and pause for the entire industry. And that’s not something we can have in 10 or 15 years as we’re at a key point in reducing our fossil fuel emissions. So all of a sudden lose all our reactors and have to turn to very polluting and dirty fossil fuels. So I think so much could have been done to really focus on this idea of prevention and more on the prevention side than I think was actually done.

Libbe HaLevy

03:34:50

Do you think it was, you’re standing up for safety that ultimately led to what appears to be a campaign to get you kicked out of the agency?

Gregory Jaczko

03:34:59

Certainly at, at, around the time of the accident, I did have a lot of opposition from my colleagues on the commission, from the industry, because I was doing what I thought was right for safety. And ultimately they’ve never told me why they did what they did. And so I, you know, I should say it’s probably up to them to, to say, but it’s certainly, you know, a lot of the conflicts that materialize materialize around how we responded to the accident. As I recounted the book as a story with talking to a very senior member of Congress, you know, on the phone. And he was pushing me about the report and really encouraging me to essentially soften it or back off from it a little bit. And I just told them, candidly, you know, this is a report that was done by my agency. It’s my job to defend it.

Gregory Jaczko

03:35:45

And it’s my job to promote it, if not, who would, you know, and that’s when I really saw that, I think there was a strong movement to try and water down the report to try and move away from the port to try and really discredit it, to try and dismiss it and say that it didn’t really meet the mark. And I think that just objectively was not true. And, you know, I had put my face and trust in this group of people that did this report, and I felt a strong obligation to defend their work because they had done the best they could. And I think quite rankly produced a very, very good report that was thoughtful, meaningful, and really comprehensive and doable and, and implementable. So I think, you know, I can’t say enough about the work that they did.

Libbe HaLevy

03:36:32

It seems that when it comes to your position at the nuclear regulatory commission, Harry Reed giveaway and Harry Reed take it away, what ultimately led to his decision to ask you to step down as chair.

Gregory Jaczko

03:36:45

I was very fortunate to work for two wonderful elected officials and Marcie and Harry Reed and Senator Reed in particular was instrumental in getting me onto the commission Congress and was instrumental and along with Senator Reed and defending me and giving me the room to make the kinds of decisions I thought were right for public safety. And that created a lot of tension and conflict. And I made a lot of enemies. And at a certain point, Senator Reed is he was always a master tactician came to me and said, you know, your term is expiring soon. And I want to do what I can to protect the agency. And I think there’s an opportunity now politically, to get somebody like-minded like you and the chairmanship and have that happen now. And so to make that happen, he needed me to step aside and, and that’s what I did.

Gregory Jaczko

03:37:35

And, you know, it had been a very long tenure and almost three and a half years and had dealt with a lot of different things, challenging issues throughout that time. And, you know, I was certainly ready for a break. As I said in the book though, sometimes there are questions that people ask and you know, that they’re not really asking you, they’re telling you there was one that I do. It was really the right choice for me. And it was what I thought would have been a good interest for the agency long-term as well. So when he asked me to step down, I said that I would set in motion. Then the opportunity for a replacement for me,

Libbe HaLevy

03:38:11

We will continue with our special interview with former nuclear regulatory commission chair, Gregory Jasko in just a moment. But first I know that you care about getting honest, verifiable nuclear news. Otherwise you wouldn’t be listening to the show. And while other news organizations interviewing Greg yacht SCO have been expressing fresh outrage over their newly-minted understanding of nuclear industry machinations. If you’re a regular listener to nuclear hot seat, you already know the learning curve that they’re just starting to travel. That’s why we’re taking a deeper dive than most, not only into the big headline talking points, but the connective tissue that holds this story together and will continue to underlie a dangerously captured regulatory agency. That’s what you listened to nuclear hot seat for. That’s the different perspective that comes from following nuclear issues every week, week after week, making us the longest running program in the world, dedicated exclusively to nuclear issues.

Libbe HaLevy

03:39:23

Isn’t that worth a donation. If we’re to keep going, we need your help and we make it easy. Just go to nuclear hotsy.com and click on the big red donate button. That’s where you can send a one-time donation or set up an automatic recurring donation of any size. So please do what you can to keep nuclear hot seats, stay up and running so we can continue to search out and share information that the nuclear industry would really rather, you not know whatever you can do to help you have my gratitude. Now, back to our special extended interview with the former head of the nuclear regulatory commission, Gregory Jasko, let’s move on to taking a look at the nuclear industry here in the U S with several of the points that you do make through the course of your excellent book. I would liken it to the Fox guarding the hen house because here in the U S it’s the companies or utilities that own the reactors that are responsible for cleanup after an accident and setting those standards, not the government, or at least that’s what I got from the reading of the book. How workable or how safe do you think that is for people and the environment?

Gregory Jaczko

04:40:41

One of the things that I always learned when I was at DNRC NRC, and it took a little bit a while to realize this, but the people who were first and foremost, responsible for safety of nuclear reactors are the people who own them. They operate them, they manage them day-to-day they have to be the ones that are most responsible. The government is there and the regulator or the NRC is there to make sure that they’re doing the right thing. We establish rules. We establish in a way, the minimum standards of what they need to do to keep the plant safe. Now that process of developing those standards, it’s a back and forth. And the operators of the plant, the industry has a lot of influence in that. And they certainly use that influence and that the power that they have to shape those regulations in a way that allows them both to operate the plants and to make the kind of money that they need in order to do that.

Gregory Jaczko

04:41:34

So, you know, there’s always that pressure in is always that balance. And, you know, I think the pushback has to come from the agency. And I think certainly the time that I chair the agency, I felt, I always felt that there could have been more to get a more diverse view on the commission to get more commissioners who were more focused on public safety and less concerned about the impacts of our decision making on the industry as a whole. And I think that’s still the case today. And I think it’s unfortunate that the commission has had trouble. I think really getting that, that right balance for what it needs for membership on the commission and, and, you know, to really make the right safety decisions. But, you know, one of the things that I’ve really come to recognize that I left the agency is that at the end of the day, there is a fundamental law and the technology and the design of these reactors that they really are built in such a way that you will always be on this precipice of on the one side safe operation on the other side accidents, sometimes catastrophic.

Gregory Jaczko

04:42:37

And that’s just the way that they are. And the only thing that stands between that are our best efforts to build engineered systems, to develop processes, to train operators, to do all of these things that we need to do to keep them on the right side of that precedent. But mother nature can throw a wrench in that. And that’s what we saw in Fukushima. So we saw three mile island. We saw humans making mistakes. Chernobyl was also about humans making mistakes. So, you know, the technology is always have this balance between safe operation and accident. And that to me means that there’s something fundamentally wrong. That’s probably not the right way for us to generate electricity. There are better ways to do it, but we don’t have to worry about those kinds of catastrophic events happening. However likely they may be

Libbe HaLevy

04:43:28

So far, we have been discussing operating reactors and the accidents that happen there, but there’s another aspect to nuclear power generation that, and that is the waste stream and the highly radioactive waste that results from operation of any nuclear reactor. We have a situation here in Southern California at Santa Ana, oh, free dealing with the spent fuel, which is being buried in 50 ton canisters, which are only five eights of an inch thick stainless steel. They are being placed only 100 feet from the Pacific ocean. There’s no way to monitor these canisters or remove them as something goes wrong. And where despite serial near miss accidents and miscalculation by Southern California, which is the owner operator in the loading of the fuel, the NRC has seemed more like a codependent of Southern California Edison and the nuclear industry. Then it’s regulator. How safe do you feel the situation at San Onofre is? And what do you project is what’s ultimately going to happen to the high radioactive waste that’s being buried there?

Gregory Jaczko

04:44:34

I think as we look at not just in an ovary, but all the nuclear power plants in my country, we have to recognize that the fuel is most likely going to stay near the plants, that there, there is no state that has come forward. That’s willing to take all the fuel and, and accepted and put it in some type of more permanent disposal. So the fuel will need to be there. And I think one of the things, and I talked about this in the book, one of the things, looking back from my time at the NRC, where I wish I had really come to the realization sooner is that the first and foremost, what we have to do is stop generating the way we don’t really have a solution that people really like when it comes to dealing with Joe. Now in Southern California, it’s in an old, that first problem isn’t solved.

Gregory Jaczko

04:45:18

The plants are shut down. So now it’s a question of what to do in this kind of medium to short term period. And I think what needs to happen there is you need to find a place to store the fuel that is further removed from the coastline. And there are locations that are viable for this that I think would make a better location than what’s been chosen right now. And I think people need to start making these decisions with the longer term view in mind that it could be in whatever place it’s put for a hundred years and maybe 200, maybe 300, maybe 400 is finding a place that will be able to maintain the fuel safely for that long period of time. And I don’t think where it is now is the optimal place for that. So my hope is that they will recognize that and realize that there’s a better place, put the fuel, move it into a better place and remove the fuel that’s already been put in the ground.

Libbe HaLevy

04:46:11

I previously interviewed you at the west coast premiere of the film Indian point by Ivy miracle, which showed some of the travails that you went through while you were the chairman. There were some very difficult moments depicted when you were testifying in front of Congress and then quite poignantly showed you post NRC. When you seem to be virtually unemployable and became a stay at home dad for several years, what was it like being shut out of an industry that you dedicated so much of your life to, and indeed the job market, because you stood up for nuclear safety.

Gregory Jaczko

04:46:46

When I left the NRC, you know, I wasn’t sure what I wanted to do. I mean, I had spent, obviously I’d spent a lot of time in the nuclear industry. I clearly had no interest to work directly for the industry, you know, and it did take me some time to figure out how to go forward and what the right kind of path for me was. And I have to say one of the real benefits of that was that I did have a young son at the time. He was actually born less than a year after I left the agency. And I got to spend a lot of those early years with him to the largest then was a stay at home. Dad started working on this book and, you know, looking back, it was really some ways, a great opportunity to really be able to do that and be a dad and spend time with him

Libbe HaLevy

04:47:29

Professor at both Princeton and Georgetown universities, what are the courses that you’re teaching and who can take them

Gregory Jaczko

04:47:36

At Georgetown? I teach a graduate class in regulation and really energy regulation. And it’s open to any of the students in the McCord school, or anybody at Georgetown is interested in taking it in, in Princeton. I’ve been teaching on and off their energy policy classes or science policy classes. So it’s really in the policy world and the energy policy world that I think there’s a lot of interesting areas to understand. And, and I have some very, very unique experiences in this area. Enjoy sharing those with the students and learning from them as well as they teach me about the world and the policy world and what they think is going to look like in the future

Libbe HaLevy

04:48:14

Since last June. You’ve also been the senior nuclear advisor for stem rat, which is an Israeli American company headquartered in Tel Aviv that develops manufactures and sells personal protective equipment for ionizing radiation and its use in space. And also at nuclear reactors. What is the nature of your work with them?

Gregory Jaczko

04:48:35

So I’ve been helping them try and have their product looked at and adopted in many different segments of the economy that deal with radiation environment. So that involves power plants. It involves first responders, other types of emergency workers. And it’s really, it’s kind of a, it’s a very innovative product that is designed to help people in situations in which they would have to deal with a high radiation environment like responding to a nuclear power plant accident. And it’s a way to try and help make sure that the people who may be forced into those very difficult situations can do it in a way that their health is better protected than it is now.

Libbe HaLevy

04:49:14

Now you’ve written this powerful little book confessions of a rogue nuclear regulator, which I have to say, I found fascinating compulsively readable often witty in a self-deprecating way and even poetic at times. What do you hope the impact of this book is going to be?

Gregory Jaczko

04:49:32

I hope the book will just educate people a little bit more about nuclear technology and about how the industry’s regulated. So very important technology, whether you support it or oppose it, it is a technology that is really crucial. And as I said, right now, many people are talking about nuclear as the solution to climate change. And I want people to read this book because I want them to understand why I think that is the wrong way and the wrong strategy for climate change. I think at the end of the day, if we pin our hopes for climate change on nuclear power, we’re going to lose them two ways. We’re going to probably have four accidents and we’re probably not going to solve the climate. You know, I think there are better ways to do this. There are cleaner technologies now that are cheaper, that are becoming more and more viable. And, you know, I think when you compare those to the challenges of nuclear power, it’s obvious what the right solution. So, you know, hopefully this book will give people a better understanding about how the technology’s regulated the kinds of choices that are made every day in the interest of safety or not in the interest of safety and how those can often really affect them.

Libbe HaLevy

05:50:39

This is a point that I have to bring up towards the end of the book after having been very strong in expressing the failings of the nuclear industry, labeling it expensive and dangerous in the, like you seem to back away from that stance and talk about how free it is of air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions has an energy form and you focus only on the energy generation instead of the entire range of pollutions in air, water, and land created by the full nuclear fuel cycle from uranium mining, transport manufacture, and then the deadly legacy of radioactive waste, which would not be solved by developing a nuclear fusion process. Though. You seem to point to that as a passable technology for the future. Are you perhaps holding out any hope that a new improved nuclear technology might be created in the future or is that not a path to go down?

Gregory Jaczko

05:51:37

Certainly think, and this is where I revert back to really my roots as a scientist that, you know, there are a lot of virtues for nuclear energy, the most fundamental levels, whether we can ever come up with an effective way to use that as a buyable electricity generating source. I think that’s where the question really is and everything I’ve seen up to now has led me to believe that that’s just not going to be the case now what the future will hold. You know, I can never really say, but you know, when I look at the things that are the most viable right now, we look at the rapid advancement in solar and wind and storage technologies. Now that shore up some of the biggest weaknesses in the renewable arsenal, which is just the fact that these technologies are not dispatchable. You know, I think when you look at those technologies and how cheap they’re getting and how quickly they’re getting cheap, it’s obvious in the short term, this is the way we have to go could in the future, somebody come up with a better way to try and harness nuclear technology and nuclear energies.

Gregory Jaczko

05:52:40

That’s certainly possible. And as a scientist, I, you know, I look at that and I would never want to shut the door on that completely, but there’s nothing that I see right now that from a practical standpoint, I think we’ll meet the kinds of challenges that I think that technology needs to meet in order to really be viable.

Libbe HaLevy

05:52:57

If you had the chance to attend the 20, 20 Tokyo Olympics, especially the softball and baseball games that are set to take place in Fukushima, would you go, Would you have any concerns?

Gregory Jaczko

05:53:12

You know, I’ve certainly have concerns for what’s going on at the plant. I think those, you know, those are concerns that exist every day. They have a massive amount of radioactive material that is stored at that plant and it largely poses threat to the ocean and environment. And it’s an unfortunate spread. It’s a threat that’s going to be with us for decades. You know, there is a persistent environmental pollution problem or concern from the plant. And unfortunately there just is no simple answer to making it go away. So there will always be that concern for decades to come. And unfortunately, that’s the burden that the Japanese will continue to deal with. There’s no magic bullet to make all that radiation go away. The only thing that really does at this time, and a lot of times, fortunately,

Libbe HaLevy

05:53:59

I wish you every success with the book, I found it an extraordinarily good read, and I know that there’s a high level of interest in it within the listenership of nuclear hot seat for now. I want to thank you for once again, being my guest this week on nuclear hot

Gregory Jaczko

05:54:14

Seat. Thanks so much.

Libbe HaLevy

05:54:17

That was the former chair of the nuclear regulatory commission. Greg Jasko, his book confessions of a rogue nuclear regulator remains an essential part of the personal library of anyone who opposes nuclear, especially here in the United States. It’s published by Simon and Schuster and can be ordered through your local independent bookstore

Announcer

05:54:41

Activists,

Libbe HaLevy

05:54:49

Our condolences for the passing of Nair, J Joseph 74 years old, who was one of a dwindling number of Rongelap Islanders in the Marshall Islands who were on wrong. The lob when the U S government detonated castle Bravo, the hydrogen bomb that blew up bikini, a toll on March 1st, 1954, Bravo spewed a snowstorm of radioactive fallout on there, Jay and the other 85 people who were on two downwind assholes at the time near Jay, lived with health complications from that explosion, from her initial exposure to the nuclear test fallout, she suffered from skin burns and hair loss. Later in life. She experienced miscarriages and developed thyroid cancer. A problem that affected many of the original Rongelap people exposed to Bravo fallout of the 86 people on Rongelap in 1954, who were exposed to castle. Bravo only 16 are now still alive. And there is a documentary on this called the final years of Maduro, which was directed by Sam Denby.

Libbe HaLevy

05:56:00

And we will link to it on our website, nuclear hot seat.com under this episode, number 5, 5, 1, that’s where you’ll also find a link to the new song, nuclear blues by the snake river Alliance. Well, with your time to listen, it’s quite a catchy Diddy, and we all deserve to sing along and they picked you’re taken by Google maps in the UK, shows a front lawn demonstration against nukes, including a skeleton and mock-ups of 2 55 gallon containers of nuclear waste. That will also be on the website. This has been nuclear hot seat for Tuesday, January 11th, 2022 material for this week show has been researched and compiled from nuclear-news.net dune renard.wordpress.com beyond nuclear.org, nears.org. The international campaign to abolish nuclear weapons or I cam w.org Sierra Nevada, ally.org CGT n.com counterpunch.org, soundcloud.com. bbc.com dw.com. Marshall Islands journal.com the Lincoln ida.co.uk Arctic today.com world beyond war.org, snake river Alliance, futurism.com R t.com and the ever captured and compromised by the industry.

Libbe HaLevy

05:57:20

They’re supposed to be regulating nuclear regulatory commission. If you’d like to get nuclear, hot seat delivered via email each week, it’s the easiest, fastest way to get the show and never miss a single one. Just go to nuclear. Hot seat.com. Look for the yellow box, put in your first name and an email address and you’ll get the show each week. As soon as it posts, this episode of nuclear hot seat is copyright 2022 Leiby Halevi and hardest street communications, all rights reserved, but they’re use allowed as long as proper attribution is provided. This is Leiby Halevi of hardest three communications. The heart of the art of communicating, reminding you that nuclear war can never be won and should never be fought. And now that five nuclear nations, us Russia, Britain, France, and China have all signed off on that statement. Hey guys, get rid of your stinking, stockpile safely and don’t make any more. That’s it. That’s your nuclear wake up call. So do not go back to sleep because we are all in the nuclear hot seat,

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05:58:27

Clear hot seat. What are those people thinking? Nuclear hot seat. What have those boys been breaking clear? Hotsy the Cari Ms. Sinking. Our time to act is shrinking, but the visceral linking nuclear Hotsy it’s the bomb.